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Abstract 
There is a lot of evidence that identity matters for behavior. There is a widespread belief that 
societies will function better if they manage to establish a common sense of identity among 
the population. And there are also contemporary fears that this common identity is threatened 
in several countries. In this paper we investigate the correlates of various measures of identity 
in the UK, a country currently greatly concerned about a perceived failure to build a common 
identity from a collection of diverse cultures. We find that the alleged failure to establish a 
British identity among ethnic minorities is exaggerated – for most their ethnicity and religion 
seem no barrier to a British identity. But there is a segment of the white population that 
clearly feels neglected and alienated, and are hostile to the multicultural agenda.  
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 Introduction 
There is considerable evidence that ‘identity matters’, that many individuals think of 
themselves as part of a social group and that this membership has consequences for 
individual behavior, for behavior towards others with the same identity and towards those 
who do not share that identity.  How societies function is then likely to be affected by the 
number and type of social groups within it so the nature of identity becomes a matter of 
public concern.  Because there is very considerable evidence that people behave more 
pro-socially towards those they perceive as being of the same identity (starting perhaps 
with Tajfel, 1970) it is a common belief that countries should seek to create a sense of 
common identity among its citizens, what we might call ‘nation-building’1.  This need is 
most acute in societies whose populations come from a diverse collection of cultures2.  In 
many countries, there are those who argue that there has been a serious failure in ‘nation-
building’.  In the United States, Huntington (2004) expressed concern that Mexican 
immigrants are failing to adopt an American identity and the values that traditionally go 
with that.  In Britain – the focus of this study – a certain smug satisfaction that it had been 
relatively successful in building a multicultural society has turned to dismay as some 
young Britons turn suicide bombers.  The result has been an active debate about 
‘Britishness’3. 
But, although there is a widespread belief that it is desirable to have a common 
sense of identity, there is much less agreement about how this is best achieved.  For 
example, the British government has traditionally taken the view that ethnic and religious 
minorities are more likely to feel part of Britain if allowed or even encouraged to retain 
their traditional cultures.  However, others have argued that such a policy preserves 
differences, leads to fragmentation and does not give individuals sufficient freedom to 
craft their own identity (see, for example, Sen, 2006).  But, in spite of the fact that many 
commentators have very strong views on the subject, we have remarkably little large-
                                                 
1
 For example, Kymlicka (2002, p267) “the common national identity provides a source of trust and 
solidarity that can accommodate deep disagreements over conceptions of the good life” 
2
 According to Putnam (2007, p137) “one of the most important challenges facing modern societies…. is 
the increase in ethnic and social heterogeneity in virtually all advanced societies”.  He also argues that a 
retreat to cultural homogeneity is not an option. 
3
 To give but one example, Gordon Brown’s speech to the Fabian Society on the future of Britishness 
http://www.fabians.org.uk/events/speeches/the-future-of-britishness  
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scale quantitative evidence on the factors associated with feeling a part of society.  To 
present some data that sheds light on these questions is the purpose of this paper.  We use 
data from the UK’s 2007 Citizenship Survey to investigate the relationship between 
various measures of identity and other variables that have been thought related to these 
outcomes like ethnicity, religion, measures of integration, perceptions of fairness etc.  It 
should be admitted from the outset that we do not have a clean research design with 
exogenous variation in the variables we include on the right-hand side of our regressions 
so that what we are estimating are correlations and not necessarily causal effects.  In 
many cases (we will give some examples but we are sure that readers can generate many 
others) there will be plausible explanations for our findings that are not true causal 
effects.  We will try to avoid interpreting our findings using language that smacks of 
causal effects though we may not always succeed in this to every readers’ satisfaction. 
 Nevertheless we do not think of our exercize as completely pointless.  Knowing 
what correlations are in the data does restrict the set of possible models to those that can 
explain that correlation.  And it is important to remember that this is an area where many 
have very strongly-held views but there is little in the way of quantitative evidence of the 
sort we present.  In such a vacuum we believe that even problematic correlations can be 
of interest. 
 The plan of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we try to explain why a 
common sense of national identity has been regarded as important for the well-being of a 
society.  We then use work on identity to develop hypotheses about the factors that might 
be associated with identity.  The second section describes our data and the third section 
considers the associations between identity and the factors identified as likely to be 
important.  The fourth section draws some tentative implications for contemporary 
debates about ‘multiculturalism’ in Britain. The fifth section concludes. 
 Our findings support the view that people who feel well treated are more likely to 
feel they belong to or identify with Britain.  We also find no evidence that certain 
religious or ethnic groups are less likely to feel they belong to Britain.  However, our 
results do indicate that there is a problem with segments of the white population who 
have come to feel that they are neglected and discriminated against.  
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1. Identity 
Who Cares? 
There is now a considerable body of evidence from all parts of the social sciences 
that identity matters for behavior.  This is partly because the ‘rules’ for membership of a 
group generally require certain behaviour from individuals, often to mark the individual 
as a member of the group.  Some of these prescribed behaviours may be regarded by 
others as undesirable even if the consequences fall wholly or largely on the individual 
(see, for example, Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005, on ‘acting white’).   
But, identity also matters for behavior towards others.  A general feature of 
groups (and one that is arguably essential for them to be stable) is that one behaves in a 
more pro-social way towards other members of the same group and less pro-socially to 
outsiders (in some cases, it may be that a group actively causes harm to outsiders) - see 
Hogg and Vaughan (2005) for an accessible introduction to this literature.  Essentially 
one puts a greater weight on the welfare of someone who is part of one’s group than one 
does on the welfare of an outsider. 
From this perspective, it is easy to understand why it is widely believed that it is 
desirable for those in a country to have a common sense of national identity.  To give an 
example, suppose a society consists of two groups who do not care about each other – a 
majority and a minority who differ in their preferences in some way.  If decisions are 
made by majority vote, there is a danger that the majority will enact policies that are very 
disadvantageous to the minority – John Stuart Mills’ ‘tyranny of the majority’.  In turn, 
the minority may then, realizing the impossibility of achieving more desirable outcomes 
peacefully through the ballot box, resort to violence or the threat of it in an attempt to get 
the majority to take its grievances seriously. 
The idea is that if, by creating a common sense of national identity, both groups 
think of the other as part of a wider in-group, then the effective distance in preferences 
will be reduced and less extreme outcomes will be produced.  Although the minority do 
not have political power, the majority will, in part, internalize the welfare of the minority, 
so that the policies enacted will be less harmful to the minority.  And, because the 
minority now internalize, in part, the welfare of the majority they will be less likely to 
threaten harm to obtain a more desirable outcome.  We do have evidence of costs from 
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diversity that is usefully surveyed by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005).  They review 
evidence like that presented by Easterly and Levine (1997) that ethnic fragmentation 
leads to lower growth in Africa and Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) that public good 
provision is lower in US cities with higher levels of ethnic diversity.  Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2005, p794) conclude that there is “overwhelming evidence” that public good 
provision is lower in fragmented societies”. 
Fostering a common sense of national identity is designed to reduce 
fragmentation – political philosophers sometimes express this nicely as trying to align the 
boundaries of ethical communities with those of political communities.  But, even once 
one has accepted the desirability of ‘nation-building’, one has to try to understand what 
factors are likely to be associated with a common sense of identity.  For that, one needs a 
theory of why people choose the identities they do.   
 
Hypotheses 
Theories of ‘identity’ are very much in their infancy and we make no pretence here to do 
more than sketch factors that might be thought to be important.  We structure our 
discussion around the general framework used by those who have introduced identity 
concerns into economics – see, for example, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) or Shayo 
(2009). 
 In order to help structure our thoughts, consider the following very stylized way 
of thinking about when people choose to be a member of a group.  Assume that 
individuals have to make a decision, ix  – this could be multi-dimensional but to convey 
the basic ideas we will speak as if it is one-dimensional.  There is a value of ix , ix  which 
is the optimal value for individual i if they were an isolated individual – this will be 
affected by the individual’s tastes which themselves might be influenced by, for example, 
the culture of their parents.  We assume there is a quadratic loss function for 
( )21
2 i i i
c x x− −   for deviations of actual behavior from the individual optimum.  The 
parameter ic  can be thought of as a measure of how flexible an individual is or how 
strongly they adhere to their original values. 
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 Individuals can also choose to be a member of a group, g.  We will assume that 
group g offers a benefit gB  to members (this might be some utility one gets from not 
feeling alone or because one gets some utility from the status of the group (Shayo, 2009) 
or because, as discussed above, one can expect material help from others who regard you 
as part of their group).  However, this benefit may be contingent on behavior.  Assume 
that the group has an optimal desired behavior, *gx , and reduces benefits as behavior 
deviates from this according to a quadratic loss function with parameter gb .  The 
parameter gb  can be thought of as a measure of how tolerant or inclusive a group is. 
 Putting this together, the overall utility for individual i if they choose to be a 
member of group g and take action ix   can be written as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )22 *1 1, 2 2i i i i i g g i gU x g c x x B b x x= − − + − −  (1) 
If the individual does choose to be a member of group g then they will choose the 
following action:  
 
*
i i g g
i
i g
c x b x
x
c b
+
=
+

 (2) 
So that the optimal action is a weighted average of the individual and group optima with 
the weight on the individual optimum being larger the less flexible is the individual and 
the more tolerant is the group.  The maximized value of utility is given by:  
 ( ) ( )2*1, 2 i gi i i g gi g
c b
U x g x x B
c b
= − − +
+

 (3) 
Group g is less appealing to individual i the larger the gap between individual and group 
optima *i gx x− and the less flexible is the individual i.e. a higher ic .  A group is also less 
appealing, the less tolerant it is i.e. the higher is gb .  But the larger the group benefits 
gB the more appealing is a group.  One can then understand why less tolerant groups tend 
to offer higher levels of mutual benefits to those who are deemed members of the group – 
otherwise they would clearly lose out in the competition among groups for members.  
Note that in this set-up, whether individual i becomes a member of group g depends 
partly on their individual characteristics – here ( ),i ic x - but also on how they perceive 
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they will be treated by the other members of that group – here captured by the parameters 
( )*, ,g g gB b x . 
 Although this is a very simple set-up, we think it is a useful way to think about 
how individuals decide on their identity.  Although it is a model that uses the word 
‘choice’, it is capable of capturing the idea that, because the criteria for membership of a 
particular group are set by others, they may be impossible for some individuals for fulfil.  
For example if having a white skin is regarded as a requirement for having British 
identity by those who are white, ‘British’ is an identity unavailable to ethnic minorities – 
in this case one might think of skin colour as the x , that white Britons do not tolerate any 
deviations from ‘whiteness’ i.e. gb is very high and that the costs of making one’s skin 
white for an individual are also very high ie. ic  is very high.  In this case one can think of 
the net benefits to non-whites of membership of the ‘British’ group as being very 
negative. 
 So, our general approach is to try and think about the costs and benefits of having 
a British identity.  We now move to a discussion of the data we use. 
 
2. Data 
The data we use in this paper comes from England and Wales.’ 2007 Citizenship 
Survey (CS) administered by the Department for Communities and Local Government4.  
This survey has been conducted (though under varying names) every two years since 
2001.  The sample is approximately 10,000 adults in England and Wales with an 
additional boost sample of 5,000 adults from minority ethnic groups which allows a large 
enough sample from those groups for statistical analysis.  The survey asks questions 
about a wide range of issues, including race equality, faith, feelings about their 
community, identity, and various measure of social capital.  
In this paper we examine how certain outcome variables are associated with certain 
characteristics of the individual and the neighbourhood in which they live, for different 
sub-samples of the community.   
                                                 
4
 See http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/racecohesionfaith/research/citizenshipsurvey/ for more 
details. 
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Sub-Samples 
In most of the analysis we focus on 3 sub-samples though not all of the outcome variables 
are relevant for all of them.  The first sub-sample is the UK-born who describe their 
ethnicity as ‘white British’.  This is obviously the largest group in the population as a 
whole but, because the CS over-samples ethnic minorities they are under-represented in 
our analysis sample.  Although it might be taken for granted that this group feels British, 
we shall see that this is not the case and understanding why is of considerable interest. 
 Our second sample is non-white first-generation immigrants i.e. those born 
abroad.  These are of obvious interest because they will have come from cultures that 
may be different from British norms and their integration into British society is seen as an 
important matter of public concern.  Our third sample is the non-white British born – for 
the most part these will be the children of the second sub-sample.  They are of particular 
interest because of fears that they adhere more closely to the culture of the countries from 
which their parents originated than to British values (see, for example, Algan and Cahuc, 
2009, Fernandez and Fogli, 2009, for evidence pertinent to this).  For the non-white 
ethnic groups we reduce the 13 categories in the original survey to 8 – Mixed, Indian, 
Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean, Black African, Chinese and Other.  This is 
because sample sizes are very small for some of the other groups. 
This way of dividing the sample does exclude white immigrants and the white 
UK-born who do not describe their ethnicity as ‘white British’.   We exclude them 
because they are a small part of the sample (under 5% - as there is no explicit boost 
sample for them) and because they are a very heterogeneous group comprising, for 
example, those of Irish origin (who we know from other work are very reluctant to adopt 
a British identity – see Manning and Roy, 2006), recent Eastern European immigrants 
and some Middle Eastern immigrants.  Any inference about the outcomes for these 
groups are unreliable so we think it best to say nothing about them.  Table 1 presents the 
proportions of the three sub-samples in our data and the weighted proportions (the 
weights being intended to reproduce the UK population as a whole). 
 Table 1 also presents some basic demographics.  The white natives are older, on 
average than the immigrants who in turn are older than the UK-born minorities.  The 
gender mix is similar.  In terms of education both of the non-white sub-samples are more 
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likely to have a degree but the immigrants are also more likely to have only foreign or no 
qualifications (see table A.1 in appendix A for details of the education coding).  The 
ethnic mix of the foreign- and UK-born minorities is also different – the UK-born have 
more Black Caribbeans and more mixed race (who are mostly a Black-white mix).  
Recent immigrant groups like the Bangladeshis and Black Africans are under-represented 
in the UK born.  In terms of religion 80% of the white natives report being Christian with 
17% reporting no religion and very small numbers other religions.  The minority sub-
samples are more likely to have some religion but are also different in their type of 
religion – there are as many Muslims as Christians.   
 
Identity Variables 
The CS asks a number of questions about national identity and sense of belonging.  First, 
there is a question about national identity.  Respondents can report multiple national 
identities.  Here we restrict attention to those who report a British identity (which means 
at least one of British, English, Scottish or Welsh) – we denote this variable by BRITID5.  
Table 3 shows that almost all white natives report a British identity so it is not interesting 
to analyse answers to this question for this group.  For non-white natives, the reported 
levels of British identity are lower but still very high at 95%, perhaps higher than many 
might expect.  For non-white immigrants reported levels of British identity are lower – 
58%.  These findings are in line with those reported using Labour Force Survey data in 
Manning and Roy (2006).  One problem with this outcome variable is that it may be 
interpreted in a very legalistic way so that one reports a British identity if one holds a 
British passport (Manning and Roy, 2006 show that, for immigrants, citizenship is very 
strongly though not perfectly associated with reporting a British identity).  In terms of the 
theoretical framework sketched above, many respondents may consider the criterion for 
having a British national identity to be ‘I have a British passport’.  For this reason we also 
analyse other questions asked in the CS. 
                                                 
5
 It is an interesting and important question to consider how the recent devolution of political power to 
Scotland and Wales affects sub-national identities in the UK.  But this is not our main focus of interest here 
so we ignore it. 
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First, there is a question “to what extent do you agree or disagree that you 
personally feel a part of British society?” - FEELBRIT.  This is a 4-point scale with 0 
representing ‘strongly disagree’ and 1 ‘strongly agree’.  The mean response for our sub-
samples are reported in Table 2. - as one can see there are similar levels of responses for 
all three sub-samples which might indicate that the UK has done a good job in making 
immigrants and their children feel a part of British society or that it has succeeded in 
alienating a non-trivial portion of the native white section.  But, just because there are 
similar overall levels reported for the three sub-samples does not mean the factors 
associated with feeling part of society are the same and we shall see they are not.   
There is also a question on ‘How strongly do you feel you belong to Britain?’, - 
BELONGBRIT - a 4-point scale with 0 representing ‘not at all strongly’ and 1 ‘very 
strongly.  Table 2 again shows similar levels of sense of belonging among the 3 sub-
samples.  This is correlated with FEELBRIT but the level of correlation is low. 
Finally, it is interesting to compare this with the sense of belonging to the 
neighbourhood and the local area with responses to the question on ‘How strongly do you 
feel you belong to your immediate neighbourhood?’, - BELONGNEIGH –and ‘How 
strongly do you feel you belong to your local area?’-BELONGLOC. Both  variables are 
coded on a  4-point scale with 0 representing ‘not at all strongly’ and 1 ‘very strongly’.  
Again, all 3 sub-samples show similar levels in these variables. 
 All of these variables relate to the individual’s sense of their own identity.  But it 
is equally, if not more important, to consider the perception of your identity by others.  
We may well think it a problem if whites do not think of non-whites as British even if the 
non-whites themselves do.  The CS has a number of questions which help us to get at 
this.  First there a question –DUALID -“How much do you agree or disagree that it is 
possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural and religious 
identity?”coded on a 4-point scale where 0 is “strongly disagree” and 1 is “strongly 
agree”.  Here we do see differences between the sub-samples the non-whites are much 
less likely than the whites to see a potential conflict.  There is a certain ambiguity in 
interpretation but it does not seem likely that the whites think there is a conflict between 
their religious and cultural identity and feeling British – rather they are almost certainly 
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referring to the religious and cultural identities of ‘others’.  Here we can see some ground 
for concern – whites do not have as positive a view on this question as non-whites.  There 
is also a question FECONF on ‘whether the respondent ever feels a conflict between 
religion and national identity’ – a five-point scale with 0 being never and 1 all the time.  
Non-whites report more personal conflict than whites. 
 
Independent Variables 
On the right-hand side of the equations we estimate we include the usual demographics 
(gender, age, education, and region) but we are particularly interested in variables which 
reflect reflect factors that might be thought to be associated with the extent to which 
someone thinks of him/herself as British.  .  We draw up a list of these factors based on 
an inclusive list of what others in the literature or public debate have hypothesized to be 
important.    The factors we consider are: 
- ethnicity 
- religion 
- English language proficiency 
- Mixing 
- Discrimination 
- economic situation   
Descriptive statistics on these variables are reported in Table 3.  In what follows we try to 
use the framework described earlier for why the variables we use might be expected to be 
correlated with identity.   
 
Ethnicity 
A central part of debates about national identity in Britain has been about whether ethnic 
minorities feel a part of Britain.  There are a number of reasons why they might be less 
likely than whites to feel a part of Britain.  First, it is very likely that non-whites are the 
children of immigrants so (following research like Algan and Cahuc, 2009; Fernandez 
and Fogli, 2009) may have cultural values different from the white majority i.e. high 
values of *i gx x− .  But, it could also be that non-whites might say they do not feel British 
because they do not feel accepted by the white majority part of society so perceive the 
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group benefits gB  to be low or the white majority as intolerant of deviations from white 
norms – a high value of gb .   
We  include variables that relate to self-described ethnicity and also variables 
which can be thought of measuring the intensity of ethnic identification (see Constant, 
Gataullina and Zimmermann (2008) for other ways of doing this).  The strength of ethnic 
identification could be interpreted as being about how much one is attached to the culture 
of one’s forebears i.e. to the value of ic .  The CS contains two measures of the strength 
od ethnic identification – there is a question which asks ‘how important is your ethnic 
background to your sense of who you are” (IMPETH) and a variable (IMPFO) which 
asks a similar question about the country from which the family came originally. Table 3 
shows the average values of these variables for our 3 sub-samples – both of the non-white 
sub-samples attach more importance to ethnicity with similar level of importance of 
ethnicity between UK-born and immigrants but with higher importance of family origin 
for immigrants.  However, white natives do show quite high levels of both of these 
variables. 
 
Religion 
Most, if not all, religions, mandate certain behaviours on the part of its adherents and 
encourage parents to transmit these values to their children.  So, we might expect those 
who are religious to have relatively high values of ic .  This will then act to reduce the 
benefits of membership of any group with norms of behavior very different from that of 
the religion i.e. a high value of *i gx x− .  Although all religions probably contain some 
element of this, it is possible that it is more relevant for some religions than others.  For 
example, a key part of radical Islamist ideas is that the first (and perhaps only) loyalty of 
Muslims should be towards Muslims of any nationality – the ‘umma’.  If these views are 
widely held we might expect to see low levels of British identity among Muslims.  This is 
one reason to control for religion – the categories being Christian, Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, 
Other and None.  We also have some controls that measure the intensity of religious 
devotion – whether the religion is being actively practiced, the importance of religion to 
one’s sense of identity, and the importance of religion for where you live, where you 
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work, who your friends are and what school you send your children to.  We combine all 
of these measures into a single measure – IMPORTREL – which measures the 
importance of religion to the individual6.  Table 3 shows that religion is least important to 
the white natives and most important for the non-white immigrants.  There are significant 
differences in the importance of religion across religions – it is most important to 
Muslims (in line with the findings of Bisin et al, 2008) but there is not a clean division 
between them and others – Sikhs and Hindus lie between the Muslims and Christians in 
the importance of religion. 
 
Language Proficiency 
It is commonly argued that language proficiency is critical in enabling people to be full 
citizens.  Policy changes in the UK in recent years have been directed towards ensuring 
that immigrants are sufficiently proficient to be able to hold down a job and mix with 
those outside their culture.  In terms of the model developed above, one could argue that 
having a common language means people are more likely to care about the same things 
so that norms of behavior are more likely to be similar i.e. the value of *i gx x−  will be 
reduced.    
The CS contains a number of variables relating to proficiency in English.  We 
combine four such measures - whether English is the main language spoken at home, and 
the level of proficiency in speaking, reading and writing into a single composite measure 
ELANG7.  As one would expect English proficiency is highest for white natives, 
followed by non-white natives and non-white immigrants.  It is worth noting that very 
few non-white natives report any problem with English so, as one might expect, all 
language problems affect only the first generation.  In this context it is worth noting that 
there has been little or no dissent in the UK from the view that all education should be in 
English so bilingualism is not the issue it is in some other countries (see, for example, 
Aspachs-Bracons et al 2008a,b, or Angrist et al, 2008) 
                                                 
6
 Details of the construct of this and other composite measures can be found in Appendix A. 
 
7
 Unfortunately the routing of the questions does not ask abut proficiency for those who speak English at 
home (and we assume they are proficient) even though there are, for example, well-known literacy 
problems among segments of the white native population. 
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Mixing 
Fears are often expressed about how much mixing there is between cultures in Britain – it 
is argued that some groups mix very little outside their own ethnic group and that this 
hinders their participation in British society.  There is a large literature on how attitudes 
towards ethnic and religious groups that differ from your own is affected by contact with 
those groups – Putnam (2007) provides an excellent discussion.  Put simply, the ‘contact’ 
hypothesis suggests that mixing makes one more favorably inclined to other groups, but 
the ‘conflict’ hypothesis suggests that it simply brings conflict into the open.  The 
‘contact’ hypothesis could be interpreted as predicting that people will become more 
tolerant of the difference of others, i.e. mixing acts to lower gb , that it makes people 
more similar in terms of norms i.e. it lowers *i gx x− , or that it makes individuals more 
flexible i.e. it lowers ic .  On the other hand, the ’conflict’ hypothesis might suggest that 
groups become less tolerant of diversity when there is competition among groups as they 
need to work harder to preserve their advantages.  
The CS contains a number of variables related to this.  First, there is a measure of 
the proportion of non-whites in the ward in which the respondent lives (PETHWARD) – 
this is only recorded as deciles across wards.  This is hard data from the 2000 Census.  As 
can be seen from Table 3, the non-white sub-samples are more likely to live in wards 
with many non-whites. The UK-born minorities are only marginally less segregated 
residentially than the immigrants.  
 Secondly there is a variable about perceptions of the ethnic mix in the local area 
(ETHAREA).  This is a 4-point scale taking the value 0 if everyone is the same ethnicity 
as the respondent and 1 if less than half are the same ethnicity.   Whites are more likely to 
live in an area with lots of the same ethnicity as one would expect.  
 These variables might be expected to reflect the opportunities for mixing but there 
are also some more direct questions about actual mixing.  There are questions about the 
proportion of friends of the same ethnicity, and how often one mixes with people of a 
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different ethnicity in various environments8.  The variable MIXING is a composite 
extracted from ten variables (see table A.7 in appendix A for details).  Table 3 shows that 
white natives are least likely to have friends of a different ethnicity (perhaps not 
surprising given the proportions in the population) but that there is more mixing for non-
white natives than non-white immigrants.  In interpreting results using this variable it is 
important whether one thinks of the mixing as unavoidable or a choice.  The mixing 
questions ask about some domains e.g. shops where mixing is probably unavoidable if 
you live in an ethnically diverse community, but other domains e.g. the home where one 
has total control.  Mixing across different domains is strongly correlated so we prefer to 
think as this being a variable affected primarily by the nature of the local community 
rather than a choice variable of the individual. 
  
Discrimination 
We have emphasized that whether one feels part of a group is likely to be affected by 
how one thinks one is treated by that group.  If one thinks one is treated badly or unfairly 
then it is plausible to believe one is less likely to feel part of the group or choose that 
identity in terms of the model sketched earlier one might think that the group offers low 
benefits to this individual, a low gB , or that is intolerant of this  individual’s differences 
from the group norms – a high gb .  Hence, perceptions and experience of discrimination 
might be expected to be important and the CS contains a number of questions on this 
topic.   
 We include three composite variables.  The first, GOVDISCRIM, is a composite 
variable derived from the responses to questions on whether the respondent thinks one is 
treated worse, better or the same as people of other races by 15 public-sector organization 
from doctors, local councils through to the criminal justice system.  Table 3 shows that 
non-whites are more likely than whites to think they will be treated worse but it is non-
white natives who perceive this most.  But, it is also worth noting that white natives also 
                                                 
8
 There are also more specific questions about the ethnicity of close friends but large numbers of missing 
values limit the usefulness of these questions. 
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show a level of perceived discrimination not massively lower than non-white 
immigrants9. 
The variable discussed above is about discrimination experienced or perceived by 
public-sector bodies.  But it is also quite likely that how one is treated by other people in 
everyday interactions is important in influencing values.  To capture this we use a 
variable, RESPECT, which is a composite variable constructed from responses to 
questions about whether one feels treated with respect in 4 settings.  Table 3 shows 
generally high levels of respect but slightly lower among immigrants than both native 
sub-samples. 
 The two variables related to discrimination discussed so far have both been about 
how any discrimination affects one’s personal experiences.  But it may also be the case 
that perceptions of general discrimination (even if not directed towards oneself) are also 
associated with particular identities.  For example, if one believes that members of a 
group discriminate against some others whose welfare one cares about, that might make 
one less likely to identify with that group.  So we construct a variable, GENDISCRIM, 
from responses to questions about the general level of discrimination in British society.  
The responses to these questions are, unsurprisingly, correlated with the personal 
experiences but not perfectly.  This can be seen from Table 3 where whites report similar 
levels of general discrimination to non-white natives – perhaps interestingly it is the non-
white immigrants who report the lowest levels of discrimination in British society. 
 
Economic Situation 
It is sometimes argued that economic disadvantage (whether from discrimination or other 
causes) is a powerful source of disillusion.  In terms of the framework sketched above, 
suppose that economic success is a norm valued by a group and that group benefits are 
less for those who are not economically successful.  The poorer will receive lower levels 
of benefit from membership in this group so are less likely to identify with it. 
                                                 
9
 It is perhaps worth noting that there are differences across ethnic groups in the organizations perceived to 
treat them worse – blacks are especially likely to single out the police and criminal justice system, whites 
the housing authorities and local councils.  Asians report discrimination fairly evenly spread across 
organizations. 
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We include a variable, INCOME, which is a composite measure of the economic 
situation of the respondent and includes among other variables an index of deprivation of 
the area one lives10 (see table A.6 in appendix A).  Table 3 shows that, as expected, 
whites have higher levels of economic well-being than non-whites11.  Non-whites are 
more likely to live in deprived neighbourhoods. 
 
Pro-Sociality 
In the framework we have sketched, identity is likely to be affected by the behavior of 
others with whom one comes into contact as how one is treated by them affects perceived 
group benefits.  Accordingly we construct a variable, NEIGHPROSOC, to capture 
measures of pro-sociality in the neighbourhood using questions on vandalism, safety and 
neighbourhood cohesion.  Table 3 shows the lowest levels for non-white natives.  For 
completeness we also investigate the association of identity with own of pro-social 
behavior - we construct a measure, PROSOCIAL, derived from questions on 
volunteering, civic activity and charitable donations.  Table 3 shows similar levels of pro-
sociality for the two native sub-samples and a somewhat lower level for immigrants.   
  
3. Results 
We now turn to our analysis of the associations between the variables described 
above and the variables we treat as outcomes.  We reiterate once more that these are 
correlations not causation and will try to be careful in interpreting the associations we 
find.  One other general point of warning – it is tempting when looking over the results to 
be drawn to those coefficients that are significantly different from zero.  But statistical 
significance is also influenced by sample size and, for a given sample, (loosely) by the 
variance of the variable.  So more variables will tend to be significant in the white native 
sample than the non-white samples because the sample size is larger.  And the ‘Muslim’ 
dummy will tend to be more significant than the ‘Sikh’ dummy because the proportion of 
Muslims is higher than that of Sikhs.  So, one needs to look at the size of coefficients as 
                                                 
10
 See http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/neighbourhoodrenewal/deprivation/deprivation07/ for 
details of how this is computed. 
11
  See http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/neighbourhoodrenewal/deprivation/deprivation07/ for 
details of how this is computed 
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well as their significance.  There are a large number of variables in a large number of 
regressions in what follows – we try to structure our discussion of the results in the 
following way.  We discuss which variables seem to have similar effects for our three 
sub-samples and then which have different effects.  We then offer an interpretation in 
terms of the framework we set out previously. 
In the final row of each regression we also report an estimate of the dependent 
variable using a reference individual that is the same for all three sub-samples except for 
ethnicity which must differ for the whites and non-whites.  For the non-whites our 
reference person is an Indian though ethnicity effects turn out to often be rather small so 
our results are not very sensitive to that choice.   
Let us now consider the association of these questions with the independent 
variables discussed earlier.  Results for BRITID are reported in table 4, for FEELBRIT 
and BELONGBRIT in table 5, for BELONGNEIGH and BELONGLOC in Table 6, and 
DUALID and FECONF in Table 7.  For BRITID – having a British national identity – we 
do not report results for white natives as 99% of them report a British national identity.  
For foreign born non-whites the marginal effects from a probit equation are reported in 
the first column of Table 4 – for UK-born non-whites the marginal effects are reported in 
the second column.   
For the foreign-born non-whites, the variables that are significantly associated 
with reporting a British national identity are the following: First, recent immigrants are 
less likely to report a British national identity, as are those whose English proficiency is 
weak.  There is some variation across ethnic groups with Black Africans, Chinese, other 
and mixed ethnicities being significantly less likely to report a British national identity 
than the omitted category of Indians – Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are more likely to 
report a British national identity though the difference is not significant.  Stronger 
identity with the country of origin is associated with being less likely to report a British 
national identity.  Religion is not very important, a finding in line with Manning and Roy 
(2006) – if anything, Muslims are more likely to report a British national identity.  
Immigrants perceiving that they live in areas with higher proportion of other ethnicities 
are less likely to report a British national identity. Quite a lot of variables have estimated 
marginal effects that are not significantly different from zero.   
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The marginal effects for British-born non-whites are reported in the second 
column.  These effects are all a lot smaller in magnitude than those for the foreign-born 
because of the differences in the mean of the dependent variable – 58% of the foreign-
born report a British national identity compared to 95% of the British-born.  For UK-born 
minorities, those with a strong ethnic identity are less likely to report a British national 
identity but those who live in areas with higher proportion of ethnic minorities are more 
likely to.  The ethnicity effects are different from those seen in the immigrants but none 
of them are significantly different from zero.   
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of these findings is that religion in general and 
being Muslim in particular is not significant. There is widespread concern that radical 
Islam is pushing the idea that Muslims should feel a common identity with fellow 
Muslims elsewhere in the world – the ‘umma’ - and not with non-Muslims in their own 
country12.  In fact 4 out of 1783 Muslim respondents did take advantage of the open-
ended nature of the national identity question to list their identity as ‘Muslim’.  These 
views do exist, and the people who hold them probably have the potential to cause 
problems out of proportion to their numbers, but are rare - most people think of religion 
and national identity as separate categories.   
Another set of variables that are perhaps not as significant as one might have 
expected relate to the proportion of non-whites in the ward, the perception of ethnic 
diversity and the extent of personal mixing.  There are some significant correlations here 
– but the pattern is mixed so it is hard to draw any very definite conclusions.  
The dependent variable of Table 4 – whether one reports a British national 
identity – has the potential problem that it might be interpreted by many respondents in a 
very legalistic way – e.g. Manning and Roy (2006) showed that being a UK citizen (a 
variable not in our data set here) was very strongly correlated with national identity.  
Table 5 turns attention to two other variables that are unlikely to produce a legalistic 
response – FEELBRIT and BELONGBRIT.  These two questions are similar in many 
respects and the pattern of responses are also similar so we will discuss them jointly, 
                                                 
12
 For example, one of the July 7 London bombers (British-born but whose parents were from Pakistan) 
appeared in a video and said “your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities 
against my people and your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly 
responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters”, with the use of the words ‘your’ 
and ‘my’ clearly expressing the people with whom he identified. 
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pointing out any important differences.  We first describe the main results and then offer 
an interepretation. 
First, there are some factors that have strong associations with the sense of 
belonging for all three of our sub-samples.  Perhaps the most striking is that those who 
feel treated with respect, that they are not discriminated against and that British society is 
not discriminatory are much more likely to report that they feel they belong.  This simply 
suggests that people are more likely to feel alienated if they feel they are treated badly.  
There is also some suggestion that individuals who are more pro-social or live in pro-
social neighbourhoods and (less strongly) who mix more are more likely to feel they 
belong though these effects are not always significant or even have the same sign for all 
sub-samples.  The old in all three sub-samples are more likely to feel they belong. 
Turning to differences across sub-samples, whites with a strong ethnic identity are 
much more likely to feel they belong.  There is some evidence that those in areas with 
more non-whites are less likely to feel they belong.  Turning to the non-white sub-
samples, the Black, Chinese and other ethnic groups are less likely to report a sense of 
belonging than the South Asian, though the coefficients are only significant for 
BELONGBRIT.  A stronger sense of ethnic identity raises the sense of belonging for the 
immigrants but reduces it for the British-born.  Both non-white sub-samples are less 
likely to report a sense of belonging if they live in wards with many other non-whites 
though these coefficients are often not significantly different from zero.  Religion appears 
to be unimportant.  More recent immigrants are much less likely to report that they feel 
they belong.  
Table 6 turns to consider the factors associated with feeling that one belongs to 
the neighbourhood and local area.  The responses to these questions are similar so we 
discuss them jointly.  Some of the factors that are strongly associated with a sense of 
belonging to Britain also are strongly associated with a sense of belonging to the 
neighbourhood or area – this is particularly true of the impact of the discrimination and 
respect variables.  The extent of own pro-sociality and the degree of pro-sociality in the 
neighbourhood is very strongly associated with feeling that one belongs to the 
neighbourhood.  Pro-social individuals are much more likely to feel they belong though 
the causality may well be that they contribute to the community because they feel they 
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belong.  Those with a strong sense of ethnic identity are more likely to feel they belong.  
But the effect of some variables is different – for example, the more educated white 
natives are less likely to feel they belong to the local area, although they are more likely 
to feel they belong to Britain.  This is perhaps because they have wider horizons. 
In terms of differences between sub-samples, whites in high minority areas are 
significantly less likely to report that they feel they belong, as are the educated and the 
irreligious.  Women and the rich are significantly more likely to report a feeling that they 
belong.  For the non-white sub-samples, the Chinese and, to a less extent, the Black 
groups, are less likely to report that they feel they belong, as are those who live in areas 
with fewer of their ethnic group.  Religion and religiosity are, once again, unimportant.   
A number of general conclusions emerge from this.  First, that you have to treat 
people well if you want them to feel they belong and identify with a group, whether that 
group is a nation or a neighbourhood.  This is by far the strongest effect.  Secondly, 
having a minority ethnicity and religion is not strongly associated with a reduced sense of 
belonging.  Thirdly, living in an area with people like you does seem to have an effect, 
albeit quite weak, on whether one feels one belongs.  And one striking feature is that the 
fitted values for representative individuals are quite similar for all sub-samples 
suggesting that the degree of belonging and British identity is very similar for whites and 
non-whites, foreign- and British-born. 
But, as discussed earlier in the paper, the differences in the outcomes we have 
considered so far are a product both of individual preferences that influence whether 
people do not want to belong and the behavior of others which influences whether people 
can belong or how they are treated if they do.  It is hard to disentangle which results 
come from which of these two routes.  To try to get some idea of which of these aspects 
are important we turn to an analysis of some questions that relate to perceptions about 
whether national and religious/cultural identities are in conflict.  The results for these 
variables are reported in Table 7. 
The first variable, DUALID, is the response to the question of whether one thinks 
one can belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural and religious identity.  The 
questions is phrased in a somewhat unfortunate way as it seems to imply that there is a 
clear ‘British’ cultural and religious identity but we suspect the respondents understand 
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what is intended by the question – whether non-whites and non-Christians can be a part 
of Britain.  A striking fact is that the average value of the response for the representative 
individual is only slightly lower for whites than non-whites in spite of the fact that the 
raw differences in means reported in Table 2 are quite different.  The reason is that the 
old white British are more likely to perceive a conflict than the young and the native 
white sample is older than the other samples. 
In all three sub-samples those who feel they are treated with respect are 
significantly more likely to believe that diversity is possible.  For both UK-born groups, 
perception of discrimination is associated with being less likely to believe that diversity is 
possible.  Non-Christians and those non-whites with a strong sense of ethnic identity all 
believe it is possible.  Whites who mix more and live in more diverse neighbourhoods are 
more likely to think it is possible. It is generally true that all ethnic and religious 
minorities think it is possible to belong to Britain and to preserve their heritage.   
The last three columns of Table 7 analyzes the responses to a question about 
whether the respondent generally has ever felt any conflict between national identity and 
religion.  Again, the fitted values for the reference individuals are similar for all three 
sub-samples.  Those who feel they are treated with respect are less likely to perceive such 
a conflict, as are those who live in pro-social neighbourhoods.  Non-Christians and the 
more religious are more likely to perceive a conflict.  Non-whites living in areas with 
more people like them are more likely to perceive a conflict.  Women and the old are less 
likely to perceive a conflict. 
 
Summary 
We think that the most striking result from these regressions is that people who 
feel they are treated fairly and with respect are more likely to feel that they belong.  
Minorities, whether ethnic or religious, do not perceive any inevitable conflict between 
feeling British and maintaining their cultural heritage.  This is true of all religions – in 
particular, Muslims do not stand out in any way in this regard.  There is some evidence 
that people are more likely to feel they belong when surrounded by people like them but 
the effect is not very large.  It should be said that the effect of these variables on sense of 
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belonging is stronger than on national identity per se – perhaps not surprising if national 
identity has a strong legal component to it. 
 
4. Relationship to Policy Debates 
 What do our results suggest about the very active debate about identity in 
contemporary Britain?  It might be useful to give a brief background on British policy 
towards the assimilation and/or integration of immigrants.  After the second world war, 
large-scale immigration into the UK started in the 1950s and by the 1960s there was an 
active discussion about the appropriate policy response.  What emerged as the dominant 
idea is well-summarized by the following quotation from the Home Secretary Roy 
Jenkins in 1966: “I do not regard [integration] as meaning the loss, by immigrants, of 
their own national characteristics and culture. I do not think that we need in this country a 
‘melting pot’, which will turn everybody out in a common mould, as one of a series of 
carbon copies of someone’s misplaced vision of the stereotyped Englishman… I define 
integration, therefore, not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, 
accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance”.  This led to the 
early (by European standards) legislation against discrimination (the first law being the 
1965 Race relations Act)  and a generally sympathetic attitude to allowing cultural and 
religious exemptions to laws and practices e.g. allowing Sikh motorcyclists to wear 
turbans instead of helmets and Muslim policewomen to wear the hijab on duty. There 
was a belief that if natives were hospitable to immigrants, the minorities would, in return, 
come to feel part of the wider community – just one big happy family. The reality was 
often far from this rosy picture – there were riots in many British cities in the early 1980s 
and various organizations, notably the police, have been widely criticized for institutional 
racism. But more recently there has been a feeling that this strategy of multiculturalism 
has failed to create a common core of values, primarily because it offered minorities 
more than it asked from them in return and that some communities chose not to integrate 
into the wider society. Events like the London bombings of 2005 have shocked people 
into thinking something has gone badly wrong.  For example, the chairman of the 
Commission for Racial Equality (the government body charged with fighting 
discrimination) argued in a TV interview that multiculturalism was leading to 
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segregation, saying that “too many public authorities particularly [are] taking diversity to 
a point where they [are] saying, ‘actually we're going to reward you for being different, 
we are going to give you a community centre only if you are Pakistani or African 
Caribbean and so on, but we're not going to encourage you to be part of the community 
of our town’. The reaction has included not just a wringing of hands but also substantive 
changes to policy – immigrants becoming citizens now have to pass a test on language, 
culture and history designed to mould their values into those deemed appropriate.   
 Our results suggest that Britain has been relatively successful in creating a 
common sense of identity among minorities and that the emphasis of policy on acting 
against discrimination and not worrying about segregation or religious and ethnic 
diversity is probably the right approach for making minorities feel they belong.  Attempts 
to force minority groups to become more like the white natives are likely to create a 
perception of unfairness and discrimination and hence be counter-productive.  But it is 
worth reflecting that we do have some evidence that one outcome of this strategy is that a 
non-trivial fraction of the white population feel they are treated badly and discriminated 
against and that this acts to reduce their sense of belonging.  So, the problem may be that 
the sense of belonging among white natives is lower than one might have expected. 
We should also mention here one other issue that has been important.  We have 
documented the sense of belonging and identity but have said nothing about what, if 
anything, is required of the individual for them to say they belong i.e. what behaviours 
and attitudes are needed to be able to say you identify with Britain.  There are those who 
believe that because Britain has asked too little from immigrants it has made it too easy 
for them to feel that they belong.  This relates to a more academic debates about what 
should be contained in ‘nation-building’ programmes, designed to create a common sense 
of national identity.  For some a ‘thin’ conception based on a common language and 
acceptance of political institutions are enough, for others something deeper is needed.  
For example, Barry (2001, p83) states that “the problem is that the criteria for 
membership in the British nation may be so undemanding as to render membership 
incapable of providing the foundation of common identity that is needed for the stability 
and justice of liberal democratic polities” and that “British seems to be largely a legal 
conception tied up with formal British citizenship rather than one with significant 
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affective cognitive or behavioural connotations”.  In terms of the conceptual framework 
sketched in this paper, this can be thought of as an argument that Britain has become too 
tolerant, that gb  has become so low, that ‘British’ identity has no consequences for 
behavior.  Note that in (2), 0gb =  will imply that group membership is attractive but that 
it has no consequences for behavior, which is set at the individual optimum.    
The variables we have analyzed in this paper cannot be used to address these 
issues but a companion paper (Georgiadis and Manning, 2009) investigates values more 
directly.  That paper concludes that there is no evidence that large proportions of 
minorities have attitudes inconsistent with liberal democracy.    
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have sought to explore the correlations between various measures of 
identity and variables that measure experiences, interactions, and integration that 
commentators have argued to be important determinants of identity.  Here we try to draw 
some general conclusions.   
 First, we tend to find that people who feel well treated are more likely to feel they 
belong or identify with Britain.  There do not appear to be any inevitable irresolvable 
conflicts between religions and cultures.   We interpret these findings as lending support 
to the traditional British multicultural project of making immigrants and their cultures 
feel welcome and respected and fighting discrimination, without worrying too much 
about where minorities choose to live or how much they mix with white natives.  The 
fears that the separation between communities that results might be creating alienation 
among minorities do not appear well-founded. 
 But that conclusion is probably too complacent.  While the British multicultural 
project may be the right way to make minorities feel a part of the wider society, it pays 
little or no attention to white natives.  And our findings indicate that there is a problem 
with segments of the white population who have come to feel that they are neglected and 
discriminated against.  That segment is not very well-educated, and living in 
neighbourhoods with high proportions of ethnic minorities.  It is not too much of a leap 
of the imagination to guess that this is the group from which the far-right British National 
Party (BNP) draws its support.  For example the Guardian newspaper on November 20 
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2008 contained a quote from an ex-prominent conservative who is now a member of the 
BNP that “The way the country is at the moment, there is no major party, whether it be 
Conservative, Labour or Liberal Democrat, looking after the indigenous population.” 
 Are the fears of this segment of the population justified or not?  The same 
newspaper that day quoted “a worried Labour MP, whose constituency is about 98% 
white and appears to have the most BNP members, told the Guardian it was sometimes 
difficult to address concerns of communities ‘stirred up by malicious and false 
information’. We do have some results that suggest some degree of inaccuracy – this 
group of the population think there is more conflict between cultural and religious 
identity and belonging to Britain, than do the minorities themselves13.  But there is 
perhaps some degree of neglect in the sense that it is hard to describe a policy towards 
these views except condemnation even when that reinforces the sense of neglect among 
this group.   
 So, it may be that the biggest danger with multiculturalism is not that it fails to 
create a sense of belonging among minorities but that it has paid too little attention to 
how to sustain support among the white population.  
 
                                                 
13
 Another example would be the 2009 Gallup Co-exist Index 
http://www.muslimwestfacts.com/mwf/File/118267/Gallup-Coexist-Index-2009.aspx which found that only 
42% of the non-Muslim British public who had a view thought Muslims were loyal to Britain compared to 
93% of British Muslims. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Demographics 
 
Variable  White British Non-white Immigrants Non-white British-born 
Age 47.65 41 30.3 
Female  0.52 0.47 0.51 
Married/cohabiting 0.65 0.64 0.38 
Education 3.03 3.13 3.56 
Ethnicity    
White 1 0 0 
Mixed  0 0.04 0.15 
Indian 0 0.26 0.24 
Pakistani 0 0.13 0.2 
Bangladeshi 0 0.068 0.047 
Black Caribbean 0 0.08 0.18 
Black African  0 0.17 0.06 
Chinese 0 0.04 0.03 
Other ethnicity 0 0.18 0.08 
Religion    
Christian 0.8 0.32 0.36 
Buddhist 0.002 0.03 0.006 
Hindu  0.0003 0.17 0.1 
Jewish 0.004 0.001 0.0005 
Muslim 0.001 0.34 0.31 
Sikh 0 0.05 0.08 
Other religion 0.02 0.02 0.03 
No religion 0.17 0.05 0.1 
Sample size (unweighted) 7842 3935 1596 
Unweighted proportion 0.58 0.29 0.12 
Weighted proportion 0.91 0.058 0.026 
 
Notes: Descriptive statistics are computed using individual sampling weights.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Identity Variables 
 
Variable  White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
Dependent variables     
BRITID: Whether reports British national identity 0.99 0.58 0.95 
FEELBRIT: Extent to which feels a part of British Society  0.81 0.78 0.78 
BELONGBRIT: Strength of feeling of belonging to Britain 0.76 0.75 0.72 
BELONGNEIGH: Strength of feeling of belonging to immediate 
neighborhood 0.68 0.68 0.68 
BELONGLOC: Strength of feeling of belonging to local area 0.64 0.64 0.65 
DUALID: Extent to which agrees that one can belong to Britain and 
maintain a separate cultural and religious identity 0.57 0.72 0.7 
FECONF: Extent to which feels a conflict between national identity and 
religion 0.14 0.19 0.27 
 
Notes: Descriptive statistics are weighted averages computed using individual sampling weights. Higher values are 
associated with (stronger) support of relevant statements/questions, see appendix A for a detailed variable coding. 
Importrel, elang, mixing, govdiscrim, respect, gendiscrim, income, neighprosoc, prosocial are summated scales defined 
also in appendix A (see tables A.2-A.10). 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables 
 
Variable  White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
IMPETH: Importance of ethnic background to your sense of who you are 0.63 0.8 0.8 
IMPFO: Importance of family’s origin to your sense of who you are  0.68 0.78 0.7 
IMPORTREL: Importance of religion 0.24 0.47 0.4 
ELANG: English Proficiency 1.99 1.44 1.9 
PETHWARD: Decile of the proportion of non-whites in the ward  5 9 8.8 
ETHAREA: Perception of  the proportion of people of the same ethnicity 
in the local area 0.32 0.81 0.78 
MIXING:  Mixing with people from different ethnic and religious groups  0.34 0.57 0.64 
GOVDISCRIM:  Discrimination by government organizations 1.96 2.07 2.16 
RESPECT: Extent individual feels is treated with respect 0.8 0.81 0.8 
GENDISCRIM: Discrimination in society 1.83 1.7 1.85 
INCOME: Economic situation 2.43 1.88 1.91 
NEIGHPROSOC: Neighbours prosociality 2.34 2.3 2.15 
PROSOCIAL: Own prosociality 0.11 0.08 0.1 
 
Notes: Descriptive statistics are weighted averages computed using individual sampling weights. Higher values are 
associated with (stronger) support of relevant statements/questions, see appendix A for a detailed variable coding. 
Importrel, elang, mixing, govdiscrim, respect, gendiscrim, income, neighprosoc, prosocial are summated scales defined 
also in appendix A (see tables A.2-A.10). 
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Table 4:  Results for British Identity   
 
 
(1) (2) 
Dependent variable  Belonging to Britain 
Independent variables Non-white Immigrants Non-white British-born 
Age 0.0290** -0.00517 
 (0.00923) (0.00457) 
Female -0.00168 0.00443 
 (0.0203) (0.00835) 
Mixed ethnicity -0.178*** 0.00847 
 (0.0531) (0.0200) 
Pakistani 0.0591 0.0137 
 (0.0418) (0.0130) 
Bangladeshi 0.0774 0.00400 
 (0.0505) (0.0201) 
Black Caribbean 0.0798 0.0144 
 (0.0462) (0.0200) 
Black African -0.105* -0.0234 
 (0.0417) (0.0409) 
Chinese -0.164* -0.0773 
 (0.0665) (0.0884) 
Other ethnicity -0.144*** -0.0125 
 (0.0366) (0.0306) 
IMPETH -0.0267 -0.0402* 
 (0.0444) (0.0204) 
IMPFO -0.137** -0.0172 
 (0.0433) (0.0170) 
non-Christian   
   
Hindu 0.0661 -0.0304 
 (0.0376) (0.0442) 
Muslim 0.104*** -0.0339 
 (0.0316) (0.0311) 
Sikh -0.0309 -0.0207 
 (0.0560) (0.0409) 
Other religion -0.0148 -0.0438 
 (0.0510) (0.0483) 
No religion -0.0320 -0.0555 
 (0.0549) (0.0316) 
IMPORTREL 0.0654 -0.0425* 
 (0.0439) (0.0185) 
ELANG 0.106***  
 (0.0190)  
PETHWARD -0.00398 0.00655* 
 (0.00926) (0.00293) 
ETHAREA -0.0309* -0.00870 
 (0.0128) (0.00465) 
MIXING -0.0157 0.0186 
 28 
 (0.0515) (0.0224) 
GOVDISCRIM -0.0308 -0.0193 
 (0.0488) (0.0185) 
RESPECT 0.0467 -0.00785 
 (0.0736) (0.0311) 
GENDISCRIM 0.0256 0.0109 
 (0.0243) (0.00957) 
Education -0.00455 0.00350 
 (0.00494) (0.00233) 
INCOME 0.0412* 0.00696 
 (0.0168) (0.00710) 
NEIGHPROSOC -0.0131 0.00228 
 (0.0200) (0.00846) 
PROSOCIAL -0.0255 -0.0148 
 (0.146) (0.0647) 
came to UK in the last 5 
years    -0.534***  
 (0.0218)  
came to UK 6/7 years 
ago   -0.295***  
 (0.0324)  
R-squared 0.266 0.098 
Observations 3170 1365 
0.75    0.96 
Fitted value for reference 
individual (0.03)  (0.03) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Importrel, elang, mixing, 
govdiscrim, respect, gendiscr, income, neighprosoc, prosocial are summated scales defined in appendix A (see tables 
A.2-A.10). Fitted values for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent variables 
across the three subsamples  (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to 
the sample mean value for  categorical variables) with religion set to “Christian” and ethnicity for non-whites being 
“Indian”. 
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Table 5:  Results for Sense of Belonging to Britain  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable  
Feeling part of Britain Belonging to Britain 
Independent 
variables 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
Age 0.005** 0.017*** 0.004 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.013 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
Female 0.007 -0.018** 0.007 -0.003 -0.010 0.027** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) 
Mixed ethnicity  -0.035 0.001  -0.076*** -0.043 
  (0.023) (0.025)  (0.024) (0.032) 
Pakistani  0.003 -0.002  -0.023 -0.001 
  (0.017) (0.023)  (0.018) (0.029) 
Bangladeshi  0.019 -0.004  0.015 -0.056 
  (0.021) (0.035)  (0.022) (0.042) 
Black Caribbean  -0.036 -0.036  -0.066*** -0.087*** 
  (0.020) (0.025)  (0.021) (0.032) 
Black African  -0.011 -0.034  -0.027 -0.090** 
  (0.017) (0.031)  (0.018) (0.041) 
Chinese  -0.069** -0.039  -0.136*** -0.080 
  (0.031) (0.043)  (0.032) (0.047) 
Other ethnicity  -0.013 -0.035  -0.039** -0.131*** 
  (0.014) (0.028)  (0.015) (0.036) 
IMPETH 0.052*** 0.014 -0.050** 0.095*** 0.031 -0.045 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.024) (0.012) (0.019) (0.028) 
IMPFO  0.028 -0.007  -0.024 0.014 
  (0.017) (0.021)  (0.017) (0.024) 
non-Christian -0.037   -0.039   
 (0.020)   (0.022)   
Hindu  0.010 -0.018  -0.012 -0.045 
  (0.016) (0.027)  (0.017) (0.033) 
Muslim  0.0001 0.001  0.008 -0.013 
  (0.014) (0.024)  (0.014) (0.031) 
Sikh  -0.016 -0.014  -0.016 -0.010 
  (0.022) (0.027)  (0.022) (0.034) 
Other religion  -0.040 -0.078**  -0.043** 0.016 
  (0.022) (0.034)  (0.021) (0.034) 
No religion -0.019** -0.028 -0.010 -0.023** -0.069*** -0.021 
 (0.008) (0.025) (0.020) (0.010) (0.026) (0.025) 
IMPORTREL 0.006 -0.031 -0.016 0.025 -0.039** -0.010 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.025) (0.016) (0.019) (0.029) 
ELANG  0.033***   0.037***  
  (0.008)   (0.008)  
PETHWARD -0.003** -0.006 -0.007 -0.001 -0.003 -0.012** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
ETHAREA 0.004 -0.003 0.014** 0.001 -0.009 0.016** 
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 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
MIXING 0.022 0.021 0.060** -0.012 0.028 0.074 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.030) (0.018) (0.022) (0.038) 
GOVDISCRIM -0.121*** -0.094*** -0.176*** -0.132*** -0.158*** -0.244*** 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.026) (0.017) (0.024) (0.030) 
RESPECT 0.241*** 0.178*** 0.208*** 0.274*** 0.131*** 0.235*** 
 (0.025) (0.032) (0.043) (0.028) (0.032) (0.052) 
GENDISCRIM -0.071*** -0.075*** -0.068*** -0.079*** -0.077*** -0.073*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) 
Education 0.005*** -0.001 0.004 0.007*** -0.008*** -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
INCOME 0.002 -0.006 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.024** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) 
NEIGHPROSOC 0.008 -0.002 0.018 0.019** -0.006 0.028** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) 
PROSOCIAL 0.121*** 0.150** 0.074 0.016 0.059 -0.055 
 (0.037) (0.060) (0.075) (0.044) (0.067) (0.086) 
came to UK in the 
last 5 years     -0.094***   -0.109***  
  (0.012)   (0.013)  
came to UK 6/7 
years ago   
 -0.045***   -0.063***  
  (0.015)   (0.016)  
R-squared 0.089 0.129 0.150 0.103 0.170 0.172 
Observations 5666 3124 1478 5681 3152 1474 
0.84 0.82 0.86 0.75 0.82 0.88 Fitted value for 
reference 
individual (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Importrel, elang, mixing, 
govdiscrim, respect, gendiscr, income,  neighprosoc, prosocial are summated scales defined in appendix A (see tables 
A.2-A.10). Fitted values for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent variables 
across the three subsamples  (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to 
the sample mean value for  categorical variables) with religion set to “Christian” and ethnicity for non-whites being 
“Indian”. 
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Table 6:  Results for Sense of Belonging to Neighborhood and Local Area  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable  
Belonging to neighborhood Belonging to local area 
Independent 
variables 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
Age 0.021*** 0.016*** -0.006 0.012*** 0.016*** -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) 
Female 0.023*** -0.009 -0.040*** 0.019*** -0.008 -0.021 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.015) (0.007) (0.010) (0.015) 
Mixed ethnicity  -0.040 0.007  -0.039 -0.003 
  (0.027) (0.037)  (0.027) (0.037) 
Pakistani  0.014 0.045  0.014 0.022 
  (0.020) (0.031)  (0.019) (0.032) 
Bangladeshi  0.027 0.015  0.010 0.053 
  (0.023) (0.049)  (0.024) (0.047) 
Black Caribbean  -0.024 0.008  -0.023 -0.048 
  (0.025) (0.037)  (0.024) (0.037) 
Black African  -0.037 -0.035  -0.042** -0.049 
  (0.021) (0.048)  (0.021) (0.048) 
Chinese  -0.099*** -0.149***  -0.102*** -0.099 
  (0.034) (0.055)  (0.033) (0.053) 
Other ethnicity  -0.033 0.009  -0.033 0.003 
  (0.018) (0.041)  (0.017) (0.038) 
IMPETH 0.056*** 0.043 0.024 0.044*** 0.031 0.013 
 (0.013) (0.022) (0.033) (0.013) (0.021) (0.033) 
IMPFO 
 
 
 
0.041 
(0.022) 
0.047 
(0.028) 
 
 
0.039 
(0.020) 
0.038 
(0.028) 
non-Christian 
 
-0.031 
(0.023) 
 
 
 
 
-0.004 
(0.023) 
 
 
 
 
Hindu  0.001 -0.027  -0.006 -0.096** 
  (0.020) (0.042)  (0.020) (0.041) 
Muslim  -0.005 -0.021  0.016 -0.052 
  (0.018) (0.034)  (0.017) (0.033) 
Sikh  -0.028 -0.038  -0.004 -0.091** 
  (0.026) (0.042)  (0.026) (0.042) 
Other religion  0.003 -0.007  0.057** 0.025 
  (0.024) (0.040)  (0.023) (0.034) 
No religion -0.036*** -0.034 -0.063** 0.001 -0.015 -0.079*** 
 (0.011) (0.029) (0.030) (0.010) (0.028) (0.028) 
IMPORTREL 0.031 0.037 0.003 0.044** 0.027 0.008 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.033) (0.018) (0.022) (0.033) 
ELANG  -0.001   0.013  
  (0.009)   (0.009)  
PETHWARD -0.005*** -0.010** 0.005 -0.007*** -0.008 0.006 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) 
ETHAREA -0.0001 -0.019*** -0.017 -0.004 -0.023*** -0.021** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
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MIXING 0.017 0.049 -0.034 0.023 0.049 0.047 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.042) (0.019) (0.025) (0.041) 
GOVDISCRIM 0.004 -0.056** 0.001 0.001 -0.041 0.013 
 (0.017) (0.026) (0.032) (0.017) (0.026) (0.032) 
RESPECT 0.234*** 0.172*** 0.263*** 0.237*** 0.210*** 0.283*** 
 (0.029) (0.038) (0.058) (0.029) (0.036) (0.056) 
GENDISCRIM -0.089*** -0.113*** -0.121*** -0.108*** -0.101*** -0.139*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.021) (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) 
Education -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.003 -0.012*** -0.008*** -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
INCOME 0.012** 0.001 -0.006 0.009 -0.011 -0.022 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) 
NEIGHPROSOC 0.044*** 0.033*** 0.025 0.031*** 0.022** 0.019 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) 
PROSOCIAL 0.355*** 0.274*** 0.271*** 0.271*** 0.245*** 0.058 
 (0.048) (0.074) (0.089) (0.049) (0.071) (0.098) 
came to UK in the 
last 5 years    
 -0.109***   -0.072***  
  (0.014)   (0.014)  
came to UK 6/7 
years ago    -0.059***   -0.064***  
  (0.019)   (0.019)  
R-squared 0.115 0.144 0.110 0.096 0.126 0.117 
Observations 5682 3155 1476 5684 3158 1480 
0.7 0.72 0.65 0.64 0.68 0.66 Fitted value for 
reference 
individual (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Importrel, elang, mixing, 
govdiscrim, respect, gendiscr, income,  neighprosoc, prosocial are summated scales defined in appendix A (see tables 
A.2-A.10). Fitted values for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent variables 
across the three subsamples  (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to 
the sample mean value for  categorical variables) with religion set to “Christian” and ethnicity for non-whites being 
“Indian”. 
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Table 7:  Results for Views about conflict between National and Religious/Cultural Identity  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable  
Belonging to Britain and maintain a separate 
cultural and religious identity 
Conflict between national identity and 
religion 
Independent 
variables 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
Age -0.012*** 0.002 0.010 -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.017 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) 
Female 0.007 -0.011 -0.002 -0.034*** -0.029** -0.025 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) 
Mixed ethnicity  -0.021 0.009  0.033 0.029 
  (0.029) (0.036)  (0.035) (0.046) 
Pakistani  0.017 -0.006  -0.006 0.007 
  (0.021) (0.031)  (0.024) (0.036) 
Bangladeshi  -0.042 0.019  -0.065** -0.009 
  (0.028) (0.044)  (0.029) (0.054) 
Black Caribbean  -0.018 0.035  0.025 0.029 
  (0.026) (0.037)  (0.028) (0.049) 
Black African  0.019 0.061  0.001 -0.008 
  (0.022) (0.043)  (0.024) (0.055) 
Chinese  0.060 0.016  0.007 0.120 
  (0.032) (0.057)  (0.042) (0.086) 
Other ethnicity  -0.010 0.008  0.032 -0.021 
  (0.019) (0.039)  (0.021) (0.049) 
IMPETH -0.023 0.074*** 0.052 -0.016 -0.011 0.075 
 (0.014) (0.024) (0.031) (0.021) (0.030) (0.048) 
IMPFO 
 
 
 
0.015 
(0.021) 
0.012 
(0.027) 
 
 
0.028 
(0.025) 
-0.013 
(0.040) 
non-Christian 
 
0.066*** 
(0.022) 
 
 
 
 
0.031 
(0.028) 
 
 
 
 
Hindu  0.087*** 0.078**  0.048** 0.064 
  (0.021) (0.040)  (0.023) (0.049) 
Muslim  0.088*** 0.111***  0.099*** 0.091** 
  (0.017) (0.032)  (0.020) (0.041) 
Sikh  0.060** 0.096**  0.109*** 0.045 
  (0.029) (0.040)  (0.031) (0.048) 
Other religion  0.033 0.056  0.085*** 0.054 
  (0.024) (0.041)  (0.032) (0.051) 
No religion 0.018 -0.004 0.031 0.024 0.156** -0.030 
 (0.011) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.076) (0.063) 
IMPORTREL 0.024 0.003 0.024 0.152*** 0.124*** 0.142*** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.032) (0.024) (0.028) (0.043) 
ELANG  -0.001   -0.003  
  (0.009)   (0.011)  
PETHWARD 0.003 0.004 0.006 -0.001 0.001 -0.012 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) 
ETHAREA 0.008 0.005 0.015 0.002 -0.024*** -0.033*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) 
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MIXING 0.103*** -0.006 0.062 0.047 0.019 0.110** 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.040) (0.025) (0.030) (0.051) 
GOVDISCRIM -0.144*** 0.022 -0.077** 0.002 0.022 0.117*** 
 (0.018) (0.027) (0.032) (0.024) (0.033) (0.042) 
RESPECT 0.139*** 0.118*** 0.097 -0.200*** -0.149*** -0.165** 
 (0.030) (0.038) (0.053) (0.040) (0.044) (0.072) 
GENDISCRIM -0.081*** 0.011 -0.054*** 0.009 0.025 0.040 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.024) 
Education 0.009*** -0.001 0.003 -0.013*** -0.002 -0.009 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
INCOME -0.010 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 0.007 -0.0001 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) 
NEIGHPROSOC 0.0001 0.001 -0.001 -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.048** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) 
PROSOCIAL -0.001 0.147** 0.102 0.025 0.078 0.096 
 (0.050) (0.071) (0.084) (0.063) (0.084) (0.113) 
came to UK in the 
last 5 years    
 0.005   -0.038**  
  (0.013)   (0.016)  
came to UK 6/7 
years ago    0.004   0.0001  
  (0.019)   (0.021)  
R-squared 0.076 0.043 0.058 0.092 0.087 0.134 
Observations 5463 3033 1444 2174 2392 948 
 0.59  0.63  0.63  0.12  0.09 0.11 Fitted value for 
reference 
individual (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. The sample size is relatively 
smaller for specifications (4), (5) and (6) because the relevant question was asked only to those who responded to 
preceding questions that both national identity and religion are important for them. Importrel, elang, mixing, 
govdiscrim, respect, gendiscr, income,  neighprosoc, prosocial are summated scales defined in appendix A (see tables 
A.2-A.10). Fitted values for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent variables 
across the three subsamples  (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to 
the sample mean value for  categorical variables) with religion set to “Christian” and ethnicity for non-whites being 
“Indian”. 
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APPENDIX A:  Details of Construction of Composite Variables 
 
Table A1: Variable definitions  
 
Variables Scale Coding 
BELONGBRIT: Strength of feeling of belonging 
to Britain 
4-point 1: very strongly, 0: not at all strongly 
BELONGLOC: Strength of feeling of belonging 
to local area 
4-point 1: very strongly, 0: not at all strongly 
BELONGNEIGH: Strength of feeling of 
belonging to immediate neighborhood 
4-point 1: very strongly, 0: not at all strongly 
BRITID: Whether reports British national identity Binary 1: yes, 0: no 
DUALID: Extent to which agrees that one can 
belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural 
and religious identity 
4-point 1: strongly agree, 0: strongly disagree 
EDUCATION 4-point 6: degree or equivalent, 0: no 
qualification 
ETHAREA: Perception of  the proportion of 
people of different ethnicity in the local area 
4-point 1: less than half, 0: all the same 
FECONF: Extent to which feels a conflict 
between national identity and religion 
5-point 1: all of the time, 0: never 
FEELBRIT: Extent to which feels a part of 
British Society  
4-point 1:strongly agree, 0: strongly disagree 
IMPETH: Importance of ethnic background to 
your sense of who you are 
4-point 1: very important, 0: not important at 
all 
IMPFO: Importance of family’s origin to your 
sense of who you are  
4-point 1: very important, 0: not important at 
all 
PETHWARD: Proportion of non-whites in the 
ward 
10-point 10: highest density, 1: lowest density 
 
 
Summated Scales 
 
 
The following tables include detailed information about the construction of summated 
scales used as independent variables in our regressions. Each summated scale is 
computed as the average of the underlying single indicators (items) used to construct it. 
In particular, we reversed the coding of items where appropriate so that higher values of 
all items are associated with higher values of the scale (in this way the scale takes only 
positive values). Higher values of scales are associated with more or stronger support 
with the relevant statement (construct) the scale represents, e.g. higher values for the 
scale ELANG ( “English Proficiency”) imply better command of English, higher values 
of GENDISCR imply more discrimination in society, higher values of GOVDISCRIM 
are associated with more discrimination by government institutions and so forth.  
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Table A.2: Summated Scale for Proficiency in English, Items Information and 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
ELANG: 
English 
Proficiency 
ENGHOME: Whether English 
is the main language spoken at 
home  
Binary; 1: yes, 0: no 
1 0.5 0.87 0.81 
 Reading: English Reading 
level  
5-point; 1: very 
good, 0: cannot read 
English 
1 0.9 1  
 SPEAKING: English speaking 
level 
4-point; 1: very 
good, 0: poor 1 0.87 1  
 WRITING: English writing 
level 
5-point; 1: very 
good, 0: cannot write 
English 
1 0.88 1  
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights. 
 
Table A.3: Summated Scale for Discrimination in Society, Items Information and 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
GENDISCRIM: 
Discrimination 
in society 
RELINC: Religious prejudice 
in Britain today compared to 
five years ago 
3-point; 1: more, 0: 
less 0.8 0.71 0.8 0.51 
 RELPREJ: Extent of religious 
prejudice in Britain today  
4-point; 1: a lot, 0: 
none 
0.68 0.62 0.75  
 SRESPECT: Extent to which 
agrees that the local area is a 
place where residents respect 
ethnic differences between 
people  
4-point; 1: definitely 
disagree, 0: definitely 
agree 0.35 0.3 0.34  
 STOGETH: Extent to which 
agrees that local area is a place 
where people from different 
backgrounds get on well 
together 
4-point; 1: definitely 
disagree, 0: definitely 
agree 
 
 
0.35 
 
 
0.31 
 
 
0.35 
 
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weight 
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Table A.4: Summated Scale for Discrimination by Government Institutions  
 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
GOVDISCRIM: 
Discrimination 
by government 
organizations 
How would you be treated 
from the following public 
organizations: 
    
0.86 
 RDIS01: A local doctor’s 
surgery 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.5 0.5 0.5 
 
 RDIS02: A local hospital 3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.5 0.51 0.51 
 
 RDIS03: The health 
service generally 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.5 0.51 0.53 
 
 RDIS04: A local school 3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.49 0.51 0.53 
 
 RDIS05: The education 
system generally 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.49 0.52 0.56 
 
 RDIS06: A council 
housing department or 
housing association 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.61 0.55 0.57 
 
 RDIS07: A local council 3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.54 0.52 0.55 
 
 RDIS08: A private 
landlord 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.35 0.54 0.56 
 
 RDIS09: The courts 3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.49 0.54 0.61 
 
 RDIS10: The Crown 
Prosecution Service 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.48 0.54 0.61 
 
 RDIS11: The police 3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.48 0.54 0.61 
 
 RDIS12: Your local police 
specifically 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.42 0.58 0.68 
 
 RDIS13: The immigration 
authorities 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.45 0.56 0.63 
 
 RDIS14: The Prison 
Service 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.41 0.56 0.64 
 
 RDIS15: The Probation 
Service 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.41 0.58 0.66 
 
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights 
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Table A.5: Summated Scale for the Importance of Religion 
 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
IMPORTREL: 
Importance of 
religion 
IMPREL: Importance of 
religion to your sense of 
who you are  
4-point; 1: very 
important, 0: not 
important at all 
0.45 0.8 0.7 0.75 
 RELACT: Whether 
actively practicing religion 
Binary; 1: yes, 0: no 0.24 0.73 0.54  
 RELFRI: Extent to which 
agrees that religion affects 
who your friends are 
Binary; 1: strongly agree, 
0: strongly disagree 0.17 0.29 0.28  
 RELLIV: Extent to which 
agrees that religion affects 
where you live 
Binary; 1: strongly agree, 
0: strongly disagree 0.2 0.36 0.31  
 RELSCH: Extent to which 
agrees that religion affects 
what school you send you 
children to 
Binary; 1: strongly agree, 
0: strongly disagree 0.32 0.29 0.33  
 RELWRK: Extent to 
which agrees that religion 
affects where you work 
Binary; 1: strongly agree, 
0: strongly disagree 0.15 0.26 0.23  
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights 
 
 
Table A.6: Summated Scale for Economic Situation 
 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
INCOME: 
Economic 
Situation 
INDEP: Index of 
deprivation in ward14 
10-point; 1: least 
deprived;  0: most 
deprived 
0.53 
 
     0.32 
 
0.33 
 
0.4 
 LOGY: Natural logarithm 
of equivalised household 
income 
Continuous; Measured in 
£000 
 
1.67 
 
1.31 
 
1.2  
 NOINCOM: Whether 
respondent has no income 
Binary; 1: no, 0: yes 0.97 0.92 0.92  
 OWNRENT: Type of 
accommodation 
3-point; 1: own occupier 
, 0: social housing 
 
0.8 
     
      0.62 
 
0.71  
 WORK: Whether 
household head is in work 
Binary; 1: yes, 0: no  
0.65 
 
0.66 
 
0.69  
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 See http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/neighbourhoodrenewal/deprivation/deprivation07/ for 
details of how this is computed. 
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Table A.7: Summated Scale for Mixing with People from Different Cultural and Religious 
Groups 
 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
MIXING: 
Mixing with 
people from 
different ethnic 
and religious 
groups 
MXCLUB: Frequency of 
social mixing with people 
from other ethnic / 
religious groups at a 
club/organisation 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never  
 
0.32 
 
 
0.45 
 
 
0.57 
   
 
0.87 
 MXFRIENDS: Proportion 
of friends of the same 
ethnic group 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never 0.19 0.47 0.6 
 
 MXFVOL: Frequency of 
social mixing with people 
from other ethnic / 
religious groups in formal 
volunteering 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never 0.44 0.6 0.62 
 
 MXHOME: Frequency of 
social mixing with people 
from other ethnic / 
religious groups at 
respondent’s home 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never 0.31 0.53 0.65 
 
 MXIVOL: Frequency of 
social mixing with people 
from other ethnic / 
religious groups in 
informal volunteering 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never 0.22 0.53 0.55 
 
 MXNURS: Frequency of 
social mixing with people 
from other ethnic / 
religious groups at child’s 
crèche/nursery 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never 0.37 0.67 0.7 
 
 MXPUB: Frequency of 
social mixing with people 
from other ethnic / 
religious groups at a 
pub/cafe 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never 0.38 0.47 0.59 
 
 MXSHOP: Frequency of 
social mixing with people 
from other ethnic / 
religious groups at shops 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never 0.5 0.74 0.76 
 
 MXWORK: Frequency of 
social mixing with people 
from other ethnic / 
religious groups at work 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never 0.63 0.82 0.9 
 
 MXWORSH: Frequency 
of social mixing with 
people from other ethnic / 
religious groups at a place 
of worship 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never 0.17 0.49 0.4 
 
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights 
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Table A.8: Summated Scale for Neighbours Prosociality 
 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   White British Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
NEIGHPROSOC: 
Neighbours 
prosociality 
ABANDON: How much 
of a problem in the local 
area are abandoned cars   
4-point; 1: not a 
problem at all,  0: very 
big problem  
     
     0.86 
 
0.81 
 
0.8 
 
0.83 
 DRUGS: How much of a 
problem in the local area 
are people using/dealing 
drugs 
4-point; 1: not a 
problem at all,  0: very 
big problem 
 
0.65 
 
0.62 
 
0.53 
 
 DRUNK: How much of a 
problem in the local area 
are people being drunk 
4-point; 1: not a 
problem at all,  0: very 
big problem 
 
0.66 
 
0.64 
 
0.59  
 NOISE: How much of a 
problem in the local area 
are noisy neighbours 
4-point; 1: not a 
problem at all,  0: very 
big problem 
0.81 0.76 0.72  
 RUBBISH: How much of 
a problem in the local area 
is rubbish lying around 
4-point; 1: not a 
problem at all,  0: very 
big problem 
0.6 0.6 0.53  
 SPULL: Extent to which 
agrees that people in this 
neighbourhood pull 
together to improve the 
neighbourhood 
1: definitely agree, 0: 
definitely disagree 
      
 
     0.59 
 
 
0.6 
 
 
0.53  
 SSAFE: How safe would 
you feel walking alone in 
this neighbourhood after 
dark 
1: very safe, 0: very 
unsafe 
 
0.67 
 
0.63 
 
0.64 
 
 TEEN: How much of a 
problem in the local area 
are teenagers hanging 
around 
4-point; 1: not a 
problem at all,  0: very 
big problem 0.64 0.68 0.64  
 VANDAL: How much of 
a problem in the local area 
is vandalism/graffiti 
4-point; 1: not a 
problem at all,  0: very 
big problem 
0.86 0.81 0.8  
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights 
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Table A.9: Summated Scale for Own Prosociality 
 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
PROSOCIAL: 
Own prosociality 
CHGROUP: Whether give 
money to charity in the 
past 4 weeks 
Binary; 1: yes, 0: no  
     0.77 
 
0.68 
 
0.74           0.82 
 CIVACT: Whether 
engaged in any civic 
activity in the last 12 
months 
Binary; 1: yes, 0: no 
0.09 0.07 0.12  
 EMPVOL: Whether 
involved in any employer 
volunteering scheme in the 
last 12 months 
Binary; 1: yes, 0: no 
0.55 0.57 0.62  
 EMPVOFT: Frequency of 
employer volunteering in 
the last 12 months 
3-point; 1: at least once 
a week, 0: less often 
than once a month 
 
0.23 
 
      0.28 
 
         0.2  
 FGROUP: Whether 
involved in formal 
volunteering during the 
last 12 months 
Binary; 1: yes, 0: no  
0.43 
 
0.32 
 
0.45 
 
 FUNPD: Whether given 
any unpaid help during the  
last 12 months  
Binary; 1: yes, 0: no  
0.66 
 
0.62 
 
0.7  
 FUNOFT: Frequency of 
unpaid help in the last 12 
months 
3-point; 1: at least once 
a week, 0: less often 
than once a month 
0.5 0.44 0.46  
 INHELP: Whether 
involved in informal 
volunteering during the 
last 12 months 
Binary; 1: yes, 0: no 
0.64 0.54 0.68  
 INHELPOFT: Frequency 
of informal volunteering in 
the last 12 months 
3-point; 1: at least once 
a week, 0: less often 
than once a month 
0.39 0.38 0.39  
 
PTRUST: Trust in people 
in general 
3-point; 1: people can 
be trusted, 0: can’t be 
too careful 
 
0.43 
 
        0.32 
 
 
0.31 
 
 
 STRUST: How many of 
the people in the 
neighbourhood can be 
trusted 
4-point; 1: many, 0: 
none 
 
0.77 
 
     0.64 
 
        0.62 
 
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights 
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Table A.10: Summated Scale for the Extent the Individual is Treated with Respect 
 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
RESPECT: Extent 
individual feels is 
treated with 
respect 
REHEAL: Extent to which 
feels is treated with respect 
when using health services 
5-point; 1: all the time, 
0: never 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.73 
 REPUB:  Extent to which 
feels is treated with respect 
at public transport 
5-point; 1: all the time, 
0: never 0.73 0.77 0.73  
 RESHOP: Extent to which 
feels is treated with respect 
when shopping  
5-point; 1: all the time, 
0: never 0.77 0.81 0.79  
 REWORK: Extent  to 
which feels is treated with 
respect at work 
5-point; 1: all the time, 
0: never 0.84 0.83 0.84  
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights. 
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